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DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
U.S. COURTS: SHOULD ICANN BE GIVEN
DEFERENCE?
Abstract: Established in 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a private, non-profit corporation that
administers the Internet domain name system. Through its Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), ICANN has also become an
important vehicle for resolving domain name disputes that result from
“cybersquatting." The UDRP requires that parties to a domain name
dispute submit to arbitration that conforms to ICANN rules. Although
the parties maintain the right to seek judicial review of UDRP decisions,
however, the level of deference that courts should grant those decisions
remains unclear. To address this issue, this Note reviews the
technological and legal history of the domain name system. This Note
also examines ICANN's origins, purposes, and structure, comparing
them to those of federal administrative agencies. In doing so, this Note
concludes that courts reviewing UDRP decisions should grant ICANN
the same deference granted to federal agencies.
INTRODUCTION
Technical development of the Internet has historically been
based on the principles of decentralization, consensus, and transpar-
ency.' Groups of Internet engineers and developers gather to discuss
technical problems; if one solution is widely agreed upon, that solu-
tion is reviewed by another group of engineers until the solution
reaches enough support from enough people to achieve public accep-
tance.2
 This tradition permeates not only the engineering process, but
also the fledgling international organizations established to regulate
Internet technology.3
See Joseph Reagle, Why the Internet is Good: Community Governance That Works Well,
Berlunan Center for Internet and Society, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/reagle/
regulation-19990326.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2002) (quoting Internet pioneer David
Clark, "We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in rough consensus and run-
ning code.").
2 See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 250
(2000).
3 See Letter from Esther Dyson, Interim Chairman, ICANN to Ralph Nader and James
Love, Consumer Project on Technology (June 15, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/chair-
man-response.hun
 [hereinafter Letter] ("But ICANN's goals and its actions are in fact the
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The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is one such regulatory organization. 4 Established in 1998,
ICANN administers the domain name system, a directory that allows
numerical Internet addresses like "192.0.34.65" to be reached by typ-
ing "www.icann.org ."5 As a private, non-profit corporation, ICANN
reflects many of the Internet engineering principles of consensus-
driven decisionmaking, transparency, and decentralization. 6
 Addi-
tionally, ICANN represents a global constituency in the regulation
and administration of a worldwide domain name system.?
Since ICANN's inception, commentators have debated the merits
of permitting a private organization to administer a public resource. 8
On the one hand, private regulation of the Internet bears important
advantages over traditional public regulation.° Global private regula-
tors can make and enforce rules across national boundaries because
they are unhindered by jurisdictional requirements."
Alternatively, the major disadvantage of private regulation is its
lack of legitimacy." Private regulators do not derive their authority
from sovereign governments, as do public regulators. 12 Thus, their
actions are susceptible to criticism for being unchecked, unrestrained
abuses of power."
result of public debate and consensus—though not of unanimity."); ICANN Background, at
http://www.icanworg/general/background.hun  (last modified July 16, 1999) (*Though
often contentious the ICANN structure creates an open, transparent, global forum in
which competing interests can work towards consensus."); see also Reagle, supra note 1
(discussing the policy formation techniques of two groups who regulate Internet stan-
dards, the Internet Engineering Task Force and the World Wide Web Consortium).
See Letter, supra note 3; ICANN Background, supra note 3.
5 ICANN Background, supra note 3.
6 See Letter, supra note 3; ICANN Background, supra note 3.
7
 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Laurence R. Helfer, Designing Non-National Systems: The
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 Wht. & MARY L. REV. 141, 144
(2001); ICANN Background supra note 3.
See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Helfer, supra note 7, at 144; A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn
in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE U. 17, 29
(2000); Henry H. Penitt, Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 215, 215 (2001); Elizabeth Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and
Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. Rey. 151, 154 (2000); Weinberg, supra note 2, at
191.
9 See Dinwoodie & Helfer, supra note 7, at 144; Perrin, supra note 8, at 215.
10 Perritt, supra note 8, at 221.
11 See Dinwoodie & Helfer, supra note 7, at 146.
12
 See id.; Weinberg, supra note 2, at 218.
13 See Froontkin, supra note 8, at 29; Weinberg, supra note 2, at 217. For example, some
scholars have criticized ICANN's dispute resolution policy for failing to conform to U.S.
constitutional due process standards. See Froomkin, supra note 8, at 98-100; Thornburg,
supra note 8, at 188, 196.
2002]
	 Domain Name Disputes: Should Courts Defer to ICANN ► 	 1179
United States courts have an opportunity to lend ICANN legiti-
macy and endorse the decentralized, consensus-based traditions of
the Internet." This opportunity arises out of the disputes between
trademark owners and cybersquatters over the registration of domain
names. 13
 Essentially, a cybersquatter registers a domain name contain-
ing a trademark, for example "panavision.com," and then ransoms
the domain name to the trademark holder. 16
 There are two legal solu-
tions to such disputes: ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) and the federal Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act (ACPA) . 17
A recent case exemplifies both the issues involved in domain
name disputes and the role of federal courts in bolstering ICANN's
legitimacy. 18
 In 1998, Jay Sallen registered the domain name "corin-
thians.com " with Network Solutions, Inc., a domain name registrar
accredited by ICANN. 19
 Approximately one year later Sallen con-
tacted Corinthians Licenciamentos, a Brazilian corporation holding
trademark rights in the name "Corinthiao," the Portuguese equivalent
of Corinthians and also the name of a popular Brazilian soccer
team.20
 Sallen explained to Corinthians that several people had of-
fered to buy "corinthians.com " and suggested it was in Corinthians'
interest to purchase the domain name. 21
Corinthians initiated UDRP proceedings through ICANN to re-
cover "corinthians.com ."22
 Sallen lost at the UDRP proceeding and
promptly filed suit in federal court. 23
 Salim] alleged that, contrary to
the UDRP determination, his actions were not cybersquatting under
14 See Dinwoodie Helfer, supra note 7, at 203-09 (exploring the effects of national
court review of ICANN's dispute resolution policy); Donna Howard, Note and Comment,
Trademarks and Service Marks and Internet Domain Names: Giving ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ,
ST. U. 637, 638 (2001) (advocating deferential treatment by U.S. courts of decisions made
under ICANN's dispute resolution policy).
15 See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos, LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2001).
10 See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 E3d 489, 493 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied 530 U.S. 1262 (2000); Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
17 See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (2000);
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/
udrp/udrppolicy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter UDRPJ,
18 See Sallen, 273 E3d at 14.
12 hi. at 20.
" Id. at 17, 21.
21 Id. at 21.
n Id. When Salim registered the domain name with Network Solutions he had agreed
to resolve disputes concerning the name under UDRP proceedings. Id. at 20.
23 Sallen, 273 F.3d at 18.
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the ACPA.24 The United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts dismissed Sallen's complaint on the grounds that no actual
controversy existed between the parties because Corinthians never
claimed that Sallen violated the ACPA. 25
In 2001, in Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos, LTDA, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment. 26 The ACPA, the court held, allows parties whose
domain names had been suspended or cancelled under the UDRP to
file a cause of action in federal court.27 With this decision, the First
Circuit has said that the federal courts are the final arbiters of domain
name disputes. 28 As a result, parties engaged in the mandatory UDRP
arbitration can use federal courts as "appeals" courts for unfavorable
UDRP decisions.29
Although Sallen confirms that the First Circuit will allow UDRP
appeals," the degree of deference courts should give UDRP decisions
remains unclear. 51 Whether federal courts should disregard the UDRP
findings entirely, or should grant UDRP decisions the deference given
to other forms of adjudication they review has not been resolved."
Courts could analogize the UDRP to similar types of dispute resolu-
tion proceedings." Indeed, analogies between the UDRP and admin-
istrative agency adjudication are particularly instructive given the par-
allels between ICANN and public regulatory agencies."
24 Id. at 22.
23 Id. at 18.
26 Id. at 30.
27 See id. at 18.
28 See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 18; Seth Stern, Federal Courts Could Override UDRP Arbitration,
BOSTON LAW TRIB Dec. 17, 2001, at 1.
" See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 18, 26, 27; Stern, supra note 28, at 1.
" See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26, 27.
31 See Howard, supra note 14, at 638. In 2001, in Weber-Stephen Products Co. u Armitage
Hardware and Building Supply, Inc., the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois considered the legal effect of the ICANN administrative proceedings on
ACPA claims. No. 00-C-1738, 2000 WL 562470, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000). The court
concluded that it was not bound by the outcome of the ICANN proceedings but did not
decide what degree of deference, if any, should be given to ICANN decisions. Id. at *2.
32 See Weber-Stephen, 2000 WL 562470, at *1, *2.
33 See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749 (E.D. Va. 2001). So far, courts
have distinguished the UDRP from other forms of private arbitration. In 2001, in Parisi u
Netlearning, Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the Federal Arbitration Act, which limits judicial review of private arbitration, does not
apply in civil actions seeking review of arbitration conducted under the UDRP. 139 F.
Supp. 2d at '749, 753.
34 See infra notes 188-251 and accompanying text.
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This Note proposes that, because of the substantive and proce-
dural similarities between ICANN and administrative agencies, courts
should use the standard of review for agency action when reviewing
UDRP decisions." Part I briefly describes domain names and the dis-
putes surrounding them. 36
 Part II examines private regulation of the
domain name system under ICANN. 31
 Part III reviews some key char-
acteristics of administrative agencies. 38 Part IV compares ICANN's
administration of the domain name system and UDRP proceedings to
the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of an administrative
agency." Finally, this Note argues that the similarities between ICANN
and administrative agencies should encourage courts to grant UDRP
decisions the deference afforded agency adjudication and promote
private regulation of Internet technology.°
I. DOMAIN NAMES AND DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
A. Domain Names
In 1965, the first computer network was created by connecting a
computer in Massachusetts to one in California over a telephone
line.41 From this first breakthrough evolved the Internet, a globally
interconnected network of computers through which data can be ac-
cessed from any computer on the network.°
As the Internet grew, it was necessary to develop a language that
would enable computers on the network to communicate with each
other.° One such language, Internet Protocol (IP), is a uniform nam-
ing system that indicates the server or network on which a particular
computer is connected." IP addresses have become a universal nu-
" See infra notes 183-269 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
S7 See infra notes 64-134 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 135-182 and accompanying text.
SS See infra notes 188-251 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 252-269 and accompanying text.
41 Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, at http://www,
isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml
 (last updated Mar. 4,2002).
42
 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10,
1998); Leiner et al., supra note 41.
43 Leiner et al., supra note 41; Paul Mockapetris, Request For Comments: 1034, Domain
Names—Concepts and Facilities 1 (1987), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt
 (last visited
Nov. 29,2001).
44
 See Leiner et al., supra note 41.
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merical code designating the location of every computer on the
Internet."
These long strings of numbers were hard to remember, however,
so Internet engineers developed a shorthand device for IP addresses
called domain names." The domain name for a corresponding IP
address can be any combination of characters followed by "." and then
a top-level domain such as "corn" or "net."47 Logical choices for do-
main names are those with significance for the entity attracting Inter-
net users, like a product or company name." Conflicts arise, however,
when a trademark is used as a domain name."
B. Domain Name Disputes
Using a trademark name as a domain name is problematic be-
cause there can be only one domain name for each website. 5° Yet, un-
der U.S. trademark law, there can be a number of entities with rights
in the same trademark 51 For example, an airline may trademark the
term "United" for air travel service." Other companies may use the
name "United" for their products as long as there is little likelihood of
confusing the source of the registered trademark "United" Airlines
with, for example, United Plumbing." On the Internet, however,
there can only be one “united.com ."54 United Airlines and United
Plumbing cannot both use the domain name "united.com ."55
The singularity of domain names led to the practice of cyber-
squatting.56 A cybersquatter would register a domain name, such as
"united.com," before the trademark holder. 57 As the Internet grew
more popular and larger companies sought to use their trademarks as
domain names, many of these companies found that their trademarks
. 45 77e Domain Name System: A Non-technical Explanation—Why Universal Resolvability Is Im-
portant, InterNIC, at http://www.internic.org/faqs/authcnitative-dns.html
 (last modified
Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Domain Name System].
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 See Howard, supra note 14, at 637.
se See id.
Se
 See Domain Name System, supra note 45.
31 See Lanham Act § 32 (1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
52 See id.
33 See id.
" See Domain Name System, supra note 45.
55 See Thornburg, supra note 8, at 159.
Se See id. at 160.
57 See id at 159-60.
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had already been registered by cybersquatters. 58
 Furthermore, some
cybersquatters demanded money from trademark owners in return
for handing over domain names.59
 In response to a cyberquatter's
threat, a trademark owner had to choose between paying the cyber-
squatter's ransom and initiating potentially costly litigation to recover
the domain name.60
Intellectual property organizations, trademark owners, and legal
experts scrambled to find a solution. 81
 Many attributed the increase in
cybersquatting to lack of any regulatory control over domain names.°
Amid this controversy, ICANN was formed.°
II. PRIVATE REGULATION OF THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM:
THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN)
A. ICANN's Anpose
In 1998, with both Internet popularity and cybersquatting in-
creasing, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a proposal to
privatize the administration of domain names, known as the "White
Paper."84
 The White Paper suggested that oversight of the domain
name system be transferred to a new, non-profit .
 corporation.° The
administrative entity described in the Commerce Department's pro-
posal took the form of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). 88
56 See Sailer' v. Corinthians Licencia ►entos, LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir, 2001).
56 See Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.Sd 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998). Toeppen
offered to return the domain name "panavision.com " to Panavision for $13,000. Id. Some
alleged cybersquatters register domain names to annoy, rather than to profit. In 1999, San •
Francisco mayoral candidate Clint Reilly was accused of registering his opponents' names
as domain names to prevent his opponents from using their own names for their campaign
websites. See Larry D. Hatfield, Candidate "Cybersquats" on Mayoral Foes, S.F. EXAMINER,
August 11, 1999, available at http://www.sfgate.coni/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/examiner/ar-
chive/ 1999/08/ 11 /NEWS1616.dt1.
60 See Froomkin, supra note 8, at 101; Thornburg, supra note 8, at 160.
61 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742
(June 10, 1998); Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues para.
14, WIPO (Apr. 30, 1999), at http://wipo2.wipo.int
 [hereinafter WIPO Report].
65 See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000).
63 See WIPO Report, supra note 61, para. 14, 18, 19.
65
 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,749.
65
 See id.; ICANN Background, supra note 3.
66
 ICANN Barkgrounr4 supra note 3.
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ICANN was incorporated in California in October 1998.67 Cur-
rently, the organization is governed by a nineteen-member board of
directors and maintains a full-time staff of eighteen.° In addition,
ICANN relies on a number of supporting committees in its admini-
stration of the domain name system.°
Pursuant to the White Paper, ICANN's purpose is to regulate the
domain name system, the hierarchical directory of every Internet ad-
dress." At the top of the hierarchy is the root file. 71 This one data
source links all domain names to their corresponding IP addresses."
The ultimate goal articulated in the White Paper is to grant ICANN
control of the root file."
The entire domain name system extends from the root file. 74
There are copies of the root file on thirteen computer servers around
the world. 75 In turn, each domain name registry has a copy of the root
file for the top-level domain that it administers. 76 For example, Global
Name Registry, Inc. has a list of IP addresses and corresponding do-
main names for all domain names ending in ".name."77 Thus, any
modification of an IP address or a domain name at any level of the
system must be reflected throughout the entire domain name system
to ensure uniformity and reliability. 78 This system, according to
ICANN and the White Paper, requires administrative oversight by a
single entity.79
O7 Id.
" See About ICANN, at http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htm (last modified
Feb. 18, 2002).
O9 See id
70 See Domain Name System, supra note 45.
n See A Unique, Authoritative Root for the DNS (July 9, 2001), at http://www.icann.org/
icp/icp-3.htm [hereinafter Authoritative Root].
72 Id.
73 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,749
( June 10, 1998).
74 See Authoritative Root, supra note 71.
73 See id,
76 See id.
77 New TLD Program, at http://www.icann.org/tIds (last accessed Jan. 30, 2002).
78 See Authoritative Root, supra note 71.
79 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,743
( June 10, 1998); Authoritative Root, supra note 71.
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B. ICANN's Powers
The White Paper set forth guidelines as to how a private entity
should regulate the domain name system." Subsequently, the exact
powers of ICANN were articulated in its agreement with the Depart-
ment of Commerce and in the recommendations made by intellectual
property interests. 81
Soon after its incorporation, ICANN entered into a Memoran-
dum of Understanding ("Memorandum") with the Department of
Commerce." The agreement states that before turning management
of the domain name system over to ICANN, the Department of
Commerce requires assurances that !CANN has the capabilities and
resources to assume technical management of the domain name sys-
tem . 85
The Memorandum provides that ICANN and the Department of
Commerce will jointly design, develop, and test certain management
functions." First, the parties are to establish a policy for the allocation
of IP numbers." Second, both parties agree to share oversight of the
root server system, the data file linking IP addresses to domain
names. 86
 Third, both agree to implement and oversee a policy for the
creation of new top-level domain names. 87
 Finally, both ICANN and
the Department of Commerce will continue to coordinate the techni-
cal method for addressing computers on the Internet using IP ad-
dresses.88
In addition to the responsibilities described in the Memoran-
dum, ICANN was empowered to create a dispute resolution process
for domain name disputes." To aid ICANN in this task, the World In-
tellectual Property Organization (WIPO) recommended a number of
features for this process." The WIPO envisioned a dispute resolution
policy that would decide disputes quickly and inexpensively, would
so Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,743.
81
 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Delft of Commerce and IC.ANN, § V (Nov.
25, 1998), at http://www.icanthorg/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm
 [hereinafter Memo-
randum]; WIPO Report, supra note 61, para. 24; see Froomkin, supra note 8, at 34.
82
 See Memorandum, supra note 81, § II (A).
88 Id. § II(B).
84 Id.
85 M. § 11(13) (a).
" Id. § II (B) (b); see Authoritative Root, supra note 71.
87 Memorandum, supra note 81, § II (B) (c).
" Id, § II (13) (d).
WIPO Report, supra note 61, para. 24.
"Id. at para. 150.
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ensure procedural fairness for all parties, and would co-exist with ex-
isting national courts as a solution to cybersquatting.91
C. ICANN's Procedures
To accomplish the goals envisioned by the White Paper, ICANN
has established procedures for implementing policy decisions, for the
resolution of domain name disputes under the UDRP, and for recon-
sideration and review of actions that adversely affect third parties.92
•1. Rulemaking Procedures
Any policy being considered by ICANN's board of directors that
will substantially affect the operation of the Internet or a third party is
subject to public comment and review. 93 Four steps are required. First,
the board must provide public notice of the proposed policy on the
ICANN website.94 The notice must explain what policies are being
considered by the board and why." Second, there must be reasonable
opportunity for comment." Interested partied must be able to com-
ment on the proposed policy, to see the comments of others, and to
reply to those comments. 97 Third, ICANN must hold a public forum
at which the proposed policy is discussed." Fourth, after voting, the
board will publish minutes of the board meeting and an explanation
of any action taken."
2. Adjudicatory Procedures—The UDRP
Those registering domain names with ICANN are required to
submit to ICANN's dispute resolution policy, the UDRP, in the event
that a domain name dispute arises.'" The UDRP allows trademark
holders to submit a complaint against an alleged cybersquatter to an
91 See id.
" See infra notes 93-134 and accompanying text.
95 Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, art. III § 3(b) (Feb. 12,
2002), at http://www.icann.org/getteral/bylaws.htni [hereinafter ICANN Bylaws].
94 Id. art. III § 3(b) (i).
95 Id.
" Id. art. HI § 3(b) (ii).
97 Id.
" _MANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art. III § 3(b) (iii).
" Id. art. III § 3(c).
100 UDRP, supra note 17, §§ 2, 4.
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ICANN-approved arbitration service. 101
 The responding party is
notified of the complaint and may answer it within twenty days. 1°2 The
arbitration panel then makes a determination within fourteen days. 103
If the arbitration panel determines that the cybersquatter registered
the domain name in bad faith, the domain name is transferred to the
trademark holder. 104
The UDRP is fairly limited in scope. 105
 Three criteria must be met
before a domain name is transferred to a trademark holder. First, the
domain name must be identical or confusingly similar to a trademark
or service mark in which the complaintant has rights."6 Second, the
domain name holder must have no rights or legitimate interests in
the domain name. 1 D7
 Lastly, the domain name must have been regis-
tered and used in bad faith.m
The UDRP provides four examples of bad faith.m 9 The first oc-
curs when an individual intends to sell or rent the domain name to a
trademark owner for more than the cost of registering the domain
name. 110
 Second, bad faith can be demonstrated by registering a do-
main name to prevent a trademark owner from registering it; 111 in this
example, there must be evidence that the alleged cybersquatter has
previously engaged in similar conduct. 112
 Third, registering a domain
name for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor is
considered evidence of bad faith.n 3
 Finally, bad faith may also include
using a domain name intentionally to attract Internet users to a web-
site for commercial gain)"
In deciding a complaint, the arbitration panel must conform to
the procedural constraints set forth in the Rules for the Uniform
101 Id. § 4. A trademark holder is not a party to the contract between the domain name
holder and the registrar, they are the third party beneficiaries of that contract. See id.
102
 Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, § 5(a) (Oct. 24, 1999), at
http://wwwicann.org/udip/udrp-rules-24oct99.htin  [hereinafter UDRP Rules].
105 Id. § 15(b). An arbitration panel or single arbitrator, depending on the arbitration
service used and the complainaint's preference, may hear the dispute. Id. § 6.
104
	 supra note 17, § 3.
105 see id. § 4(a) .
1°6 1d. § 4(a) (i).
1°7 Id. § 4(a) (ii).
1°9 Id. § 4(a) (iii).
109
 UDRP, supra note 17, § 4(b).
110 	§ 4 (b) (i).
Id. § 4(b) (ii).
115 Id.
113
 Id. § 4(b) (iii).
114 ump
, supra note 17, § 4(b) (iv).
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Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP Rules"). 115 Even so,
the panel retains considerable discretion. 116 The panel determines the
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence. 117 The
UDRP Rules, however, prohibit in-person hearings, including hear-
ings by teleconference, videoconference, and web-conference, unless
the panel decides such a hearing is necessary.118 In the absence of live
hearings, the panel decides the dispute on the basis of the statements
and documents submitted in the complaint and answer. 119
The UDRP contemplates domain name dispute resolution in fora
other than its own. 1" The UDRP Rules provide that the panel shall
decide the complaint in accordance with any rules or principles of law
it deems applicable. 121 Furthermore, in the event of legal proceedings
initiated prior to or during the UDRP proceeding, the panel can de-
cide to suspend, terminate, or proceed to a decision. 122 Moreover, the
UDRP does not prevent either the domain name holder or the
trademark holder from submitting the dispute to a court before or
after the dispute is heard by the ICANN-approved arbitration serv-
ice. 125
3. Review Procedures
ICANN sets forth two mechanisms by which its actions are subject
to review—the internal Reconsideration Policy and the Independent
Review Policy.124 Neither policy applies to decisions made by the ad-
ministrative panel under the UDRP, only to actions of ICANN. 125
The Reconsideration Policy provides that the ICANN board will
maintain a committee of three members to hear any requests for re-
consideration of ICANN actions. 126
 To be heard by the committee, the
requesting party must demonstrate that they will be affected by an
IR UDRP Rules, supra note 102, § 10.
ne see id.
117 	§ 10(d).
1118 Id
. § 13 .
119 /d. § 15(a).
129 UDRP Rules, supra note 102, §§ 15(a), 18.
121 Id. § 15(a).
122 Id. § 18(a).
123 UDRP, supra note 17, § 4(k).
124 ICANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art. III, § 4; Independent Review Policy (Mar. 10, 2000),
at http://www.icann.org/conunittees/indreview/policy.hun;
 Reconsideration Polity (Mar. 4,
1999), at http://www.icann.org/general/reconsideration.htnt.
125 See ICANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art. III, § 4. ICANN's bylaws state that "any person
affected by an action of the Corporation may request review or reconsideration." See id.
126 Reconsideration Polity, supra note 124.
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ICANN action.'" Furthermore, the requesting party must state what
steps ICANN should take and the rationale for such steps.' 28
After exhausting the opportunity for review under the Reconsid-
eration Policy, affected parties still have an opportunity for third party
review of ICANN actions under the Independent Review Policy. 129 The
Independent Review Policy is designed to address allegations that
ICANN has overstepped the boundaries of its bylaws or articles of in-
corporation.'" A request for independent review must claim that an
action or failure to act has materially affected an individual or en-
tity."' To bring a request for independent review, a party must first
exhaust ICANN's internal reconsideration process.'"
The Independent Review Board is composed of nine members
selected by a nominating committee.'" Independent Review Board
members are required to be of high professional standing and ac-
complishment, to be current or former judges, and to hold no posi-
tion in ICANN. 14
III. PUBLIC REGULATION: FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
As the term "agency" implies, an administrative agency is an en-
tity established by a principal to carry out that principal's purposes.'"
For federal administrative agencies, this generally means that the
United States government grants an agency the authority to carry out
the public's purposes.'" An agency's authority and power originate in
the agency's organic statute.'"
Organic statutes generally address five topics: the agency's pur-
pose, powers, and procedures, its structure, and its location within the
federal government.'" The purpose of the agency can cover a wide
1271d.
128 Id.
129 Independent Review Policy, supra note 124, § 2; Reconsideration Policy, supra note 124.
1" Independent Review Policy, supra note 124, § 2.
"1 /d. §§ 6.1, 6.2.
in Id. §6.3.
133
 See Independent Review, at http://www.icann.org/committees/indreview/index.html
(last modified May 26, 2001).
04 See id.
133 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 11-12 (4th ed. 1998).
I" See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000); MASHAW ET AL., supra note
135, at 12.
157 See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 135, at 13. Agencies may be created by any legal
document, including a statute, executive order, constitution, charter, etc. See id.
138 See id.
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range of activities—from regulating economic activity to promoting
social welfare.'" The powers of the agency are those granted to ac-
complish the agency's purpose.'" Whereas the purpose section of an
organic statute describes the agency's goals, the powers section
defines the legal tools with which the agency is empowered to pursue
those goals."' Those legal tools can include the collection of informa-
tion, grants or contracts for services, and investigations of illegal activ-
ity.'" The process by which an agency carries out these powers is gen-
erally also defined in the organic statute.'" In addition, the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the statutory framework for
determining the procedures an agency can use in exercising its pow-
ers.'"
Passed in 1946, the APA was designed to make the two forms of
agency action, rulemaking and adjudication, more open, fair, and
consistent.'" To accomplish this, the APA mandates a number of pro-
cedural requirements for agency rulemaking and adjudication, and
provides for judicial review of agency action.'"
A. Administrative Rulemaking
Administrative rulemaking, or the determination of legal norms
applicable to a class of people, must comply with the procedural re-
quirements of the APA. 10 The APA divides rulemaking into two cate-
gories—formal and informal.'" Informal rulemaking is more com-
mon and is governed by section 553 of the statute.'"
1 " See id.
14° See id. at 14-15.
141 See id. at 15.
142 See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 135, at 15, 16.
143 See id, at 16.
144 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (2000); MASHAW ET AL., SU-
Pra note 135, at 16.
143
 SeeWong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1950).
"5 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556, 557, 706.
147 See MAstum Er AL., supra note 135, at 453. Although the Constitution is technically
the first source of procedure for agency rulemaking, the conventional view is that the APA
or the agency's organic statute meet whatever procedural standards the Constitution im-
poses. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978).
143 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557.
149 Id, § 553; see MASHAW ET AL., supra note 135, at 453-54. Formal rulemaking resem-
bles a judicial trial in many ways and is the least common form of rulemaking. See MASHAW
Er Al.., supra note 135, at 453-54.
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Section 553 requires three steps for the adoption of agency
rules.'5° First, an agency must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking,
in which the terms of the proposed rule, the legal authority under
which the rule is proposed, and the details of any public proceedings
to discuss the rule are disclosed.'" Second, any proposed rule must
be submitted for public comment and provide interested parties the
opportunity to rebut or respond to the information. 152
 Third, agen-
cies must then issue a final rule along with an explanation of why pub-
lic comments were or were not adopted. 153
B. Administrative Adjudication
Whereas rulemaking is prospective and affects a broad class of
people, adjudication has an immediate effect on a dispute between
specific individuals.'" In administrative agencies, a decision that ap-
plies general rules to individual cases demands an individual inquiry
into specific facts and circumstances. 155 For example, a tax assessment
on a few property owners requires an individualized hearing.'" Re-
valuation of all taxable property in a municipality, however, does not
require an individual hearing because the action affects a general
class of people. 157
Any individual affected by an agency action is entitled to a fair
hearing.158 The elements of a fair hearing are a matter of constitu-
tional law and traditional norms. 159 At the very least, the U.S. Consti-
tution requires that a person be given notice of the case against him
or her and an opportunity to respond. 160 Articulating a more expan-
sive interpretation of due process, Judge Henry Friendly offered
eleven elements essential to a fair hearing, including notice of the
proposed action, an unbiased tribunal, an opportunity to present evi-
dence, and judicial review.'"
136 5 U.S.C. § 553.
161 Id. § 553(b) (1)—(3).
162 	§ 553(c).
15S Id. § 553(d).
164 See Yesler Terrace Cinty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 448 (9th Cir, 1994).
166 See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 135, at 288.
166 See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 374, 385-86 (1908).
15'7
 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Rd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
158 See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 135, at 288.
IN See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Conun'n v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
188 See id.
161 See Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1277-95 (1975).
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Many agency organic statutes describe the requisite procedures
for administrative adjudication.' 62 The APA's formal hearing require-
ments are used only if the agency's organic statute requires a decision
"to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing."'" The APA thus provides a default hearing procedure, but
only in the event that the organic statute requires that the formal
process be employed.'" Outside the formal hearing setting, agency
adjudication must still comply with constitutional due process.'"
The APA requires that all those entitled to an agency hearing be
given notice of the time, place, and nature of the hearing.'" In addi-
tion, the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to
be held must be disclosed. 167 Parties to the hearing must be given no-
tice of the facts and law asserted.'" The agency must also allow parties
the opportunity to submit facts, arguments, offers, and proposals.'"
In addition, the APA specifies that an agency employee performing
prosecutorial or investigative functions cannot also participate or ad-
vise in the adjudication except as a witness or counse1. 170
C. Judicial Review
Judicial review is available for both agency adjudication and
rulemaking. 171 The right to review an agency action or decision is
generally specified in the agency's organic statute, but nevertheless is
available for any agency determination that is final. 172 The scope of
review, or the amount of deference given to the agency's action, is de-
scribed in section 706 of the APA.'" An agency action may be over-
turned if the decision was arbitrary and capricious, constituted abuse
of discretion, was unsupported by substantial evidence, or was unwar-
ranted by the facts to such an extent that the facts must be tried de
novo by the reviewing court. 174
la See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 135, at 287.
1" Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a) (2000).
164 See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 135, at 287.
166 See id. at 288.
'66 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1).
167 Id. § 554(b) (2).
168 /d. § 559(b) (3).
'69 Id. § 554(c)(1).
170 Id. § 554(d).
171 5 U.S.C. § 702.
172 Ict. §704 .
171 Id § 706.
174 Id. § 706 (2)(A), (E), (F).
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The substantial evidence standard and de novo review apply only
in certain situations.'" Overturning an agency action because it was
unsupported by substantial evidence is authorized only if the action is
taken pursuant to the rulemaking requirements of the APA or to a
public adjudicatory hearing.176
 Otherwise the agency action has not
produced the kind of record that allows for substantial evidence re-
view.'77
 De novo review is authorized if the agency action is adjudica-
tive, yet the agency fact-finding procedures are inadequate.'"
An agency action may also be reviewed under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.'" To determine that the agency's decision was
not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court must in-
quire whether the agency's decision was based on consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error in judg-
ment.'" Although this inquiry should be searching and careful, the
reviewing court cannot substitute its decision for that of the agency.'"
Arbitrary and capricious review also examines whether the agency
acted within the scope of its authority and followed the necessary pro-
cedural requirements. 182
IV. ANALYSIS: U.S. COURTS SHOULD GRANT THE UDRP THE
DEFERENCE THEY AFFORD ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Given the similarities between ICANN and an administrative
agency, ICANN's dispute resolution policy should be granted the
same degree of judicial deference given to administrative agencies. 183
ICANN performs rulemaking and adjudicatory functions, and does so
using procedural guarantees similar to those of an agency. 184
 ICANN
has established review procedures for its actions to ensure compliance
with its governing documents.'" What ICANN's UDRP lacks, and
what United States courts should provide, is judicial review. 186 Judicial
review of the UDRP, using the same standard of deference given to
175 See Citizens to Pres, Overton Park, Inc. v Volpe, 401 U.S. 414, 415 (1971).
176 Id. at 414.
1" Id. at 415.
2.7s
179 5 U.S.C. § '706(2) (A); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
180 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
181 see id.
152 See id.
183 See infra notes 188-251 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 93-99, 100-123, 147-153, 154-170 and accompanying text.
Bs See Independent Review Policy, supra note 124, § 2.
166 See Howard, supra note 14, at 659-60.
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administrative agencies, would bolster the legitimacy of the UDRP as a
solution to cybersquatting as well as promote ICANN's regulation of
the domain name system.'"
A. ICANN's Similarities to Administrative Agencies
ICANN is analogous to an administrative agency in three ways.'"
First, both ICANN and agencies employ specific rulemaking proce-
dures to issue their rules, which are policy decisions that affect a
broad class of individuals. 159
 Second, ICANN has developed an inde-
pendent review policy analogous to judicial review of agency action. 19°
Third, ICANN allows an individualized hearing for specific disputes
under the UDRP, similar to agency adjudication."'
1. Rulemaking
ICANN has modeled its regulation of the domain name system
on the rulemaking procedures of administrative agencies. 192 ICANN
submits proposed policy documents for public comment as an agency
would under section 553 of the APA. 195 Section 553 outlines the steps
an agency must take before issuing regulations: alerting interested
parties to the proposed rule, allowing those parties to respond, and
promulgating the rule along with an explanation of why the agency
took the final action it did. 04
Similarly, ICANN's bylaws require this procedure for rulemak-
ing."5
 Any policy being considered by the board of directors that will
substantially effect the operation of the Internet or third parties must
be posted on the ICANN website with an explanation for the pro-
I8 See supra notes 171-182 and accompanying text; infra notes 252-269 and accompa-
nying text.
188 See infra notes 193-251 and accompanying text.
189 SeeAdministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Froomkin, supra note 8, at
96; Weinberg, supra note 2, at 225; ICANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art. HI, § 3; Memorandum,
supra note 81, § H.
199 See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Weinberg, supra note 2, at 229; Independent Review Policy, supra
note 124, § 2.
191 See 5 U.S.C. § 554; Yesler Terrace Ginty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442,448 (9th
Cir. 1994).
192 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Weinberg, supra note 2 at 225; ICANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art.
III, §3(b).
193 5 U.S.C. § 553; Weinberg, supra note 2 at 225; ICANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art. HI,
§3(b).
m 5 U.S.C. § 553.
195 Weinberg, supra note 2, at 225; ICANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art. III, § 3,
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posed change.'" In addition, ICANN must provide a reasonable op-
portunity for parties to comment on the proposed change, to see the
comments of others, and to respond to those comments. 197 Further-
more, ICANN must hold a public forum to discuss the proposed pol-
icy.'" On occasion, ICANN has referred to those comments in docu-
ments accompanying the resulting policy announcements.'"
Of course, circulating proposals for public comment is not
unique to administrative agencies. 2" In fact, it is common practice for
consensus-driven Internet engineering groups; public comments are
used often, for example, by the Internet Engineering Task Force."' In
formulating technical standards for the Internet, engineering groups
often issue requests for comments to achieve consensus on a solu-
tion."2
The nature of ICANN's actions illustrate that ICANN acts more
like an agency and less like a technical group." 3 Unlike Internet
technical groups, ICANN makes policy decisions that affect a broad
class of individuals, the equivalent of agency rules. 2" Two examples of
ICANN rulemaking are the selection of new top-level domains and
the promulgation of the UDRP. 208
ICANN engaged in rulemaking when it chose the providers for
the new top-level domain registries. 408 ICANN was empowered by its
Memorandum with the Department of Commerce to formulate a pol-
icy for the creation of new top-level domains. 407 After soliciting appli-
cations, ICANN chose seven proposals. 208 Some proposals were no
doubt rejected for not demonstrating sufficient technical ability. 209
ICANN Bylaws, supra note 93, art. III, § 3(b) (1).
197
	 art. III § 3(b)(ii).
198 Id. art. III § 3(b)(iii).
II" Weinberg, supra note 2, at 225.
"a See id. at 226.
2°1 See id.
"2 See Reagle, supra note 1.
299 See Frooyakin, supra note 8, at 94-95. Some at ICANN insist that the organization is
technical only and has no Internet governance" role. See Letter, supra note 3.
2°4 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000); Yesler Terrace Only. Council
37 F.3d at 448.
2" See Froomkin, supra note 8, at 96-97, 101,
206 See id. at 101-02.
207 Memorandum, supra note 81, § II (B) (c).
208 See Froomkin, supra note 8, at 101. Applicants for top-level domain registries paid a
$50,000 non-refundable application fee. See id.
209 See id. at 101-02.
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Among the technically qualified registries, however, ICANN likely de-
cided to award the top-level domains on the basis of other criteria. 210
In its evaluation of proposed top-level domain names, ICANN
relied on technical and non-technical criteria."' ICANN's review of
the applicants included questions regarding potential legal claims
arising from use of the new top-level domain and the number of regis-
trations expected by the applicant. 212 Deciding whether to add a top-
level domain to the root file is certainly a technical decision, but
choosing which registry to add based on non-technical requirements
could be characterized as a policy decision. 213
Another example of ICANN's rulemaking is the promulgation of
the UDRP. 214
 The decision to mandate participation in dispute resolu-
tion under the UDRP affected the rights of a broad class of individu-
als, namely domain name registrants. 215
 The WIPO report on the issue
recognized that a solution to cybersquatting was necessary to any do-
main name system and suggested a quick, inexpensive dispute resolu-
tion proceeding." 6
 ICANN thus promulgated the UDRP and made all
domain name registrants submit as a prerequisite to registration. 217
In adopting the UDRP, ICANN has favored a particular set of ob-
jectives.218
 The time limits set for response to a complaint, the avail-
ability of online proceedings, and the absence of any type of discovery
or document production emphasizes the UDRP's goal of efficient,
inexpensive dispute resolution. 218
 By making the proceedings cheap,
ICANN has reduced the settlement value of a cybersquatter's threat. 22°
Again, this was a policy choice, not an instance of technical coordina-
don.221
 Although many Internet bodies employ consensus-driven pro-
210 See id. at 102.
211
 See, e.g., Questions to and Answers from Applicant for .name, .nom, and others, at http://
www.icarin.org/tIds/namel/qa.htnal
 (last modified Nov. 7, 2000).
212 See id. at ICANN Questions 1, 2. Technical questions included those regarding the
applicant's "capacity (transactions per second) to which you are willing to contractually
commit for your SRS service." Id. at ICANN Questions 10.
213 See Frootakin, supra note 8, at 102.
214 See id. at 96.
213 See Yeskr Terrace Csnt3x Council, 37 F.3d at 448; Froomkin, supra note 8, at 101.
216 WIPO Report, supra note 61, para. 150.
217 See UDRP, supra note 17, § 4.
218 See Froonskin, supra note 8, at 101.
213 See UDRP Rules, supra note 102, §§ 5, 10, 13, 15; WIPO Report, supra note 61, para.
150.
22° See Frootukin, supra note 8, at 101.
441 See id.
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cedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, 222
 ICANN acts like
an agency by engaging in policymaking. 22s
2. Review Procedures
A second similarity between ICANN and administrative agencies
is the availability of review proceedings.224
 One of the most substantial
checks on agency power is the specter of judicial review. 225 Although
the courts do not substitute their judgment for that of agencies,
courts still perform a searching inquiry into agency action. 228
 Judicial
review ensures that agencies do not overstep the bounds of their or-
ganic statutes or act irrationally. 227
ICANN's review policies serve a similar function. 228
 Any party af-
fected by an ICANN action can file a request for reconsideration
within thirty days.229
 After reconsideration has been exhausted,
ICANN allows for independent third party review of ICANN action 23°
Independent review of ICANN policy takes place upon request by
anyone materially affected by ICANN's action, or by a domain name
registry like Network Solutions. 231
 A nine-member panel then decides
if ICANN violated its bylaws or articles of incorporation.232
One criticism of ICANN's review process is that, unlike an agency,
ICANN's organic documents provide no meaningful constraints. 233 In
reviewing agency action, a court must determine if the action is con-
sistent with the agency's organic statute. 234
 The independent review
board, on the other hand, must determine if ICANN violated its arti-
cles of incorporation or bylaws. 235 These articles and bylaws, however,
were not imposed by an outside legislature seeking to constrain
ICANN's powers—they were drafted by ICANN's lawyers and staff. 256
222 See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 226.
225 See Froonrkin, supra note 8, at 101.
"4 SeeAdrninistrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); Weinberg, supra note 2, at
229; Independent Review Policy, supra note 124, § 2.
"A Weinberg, supra note 2, at 221.
226
 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
1121 See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 221, 231, 233.
"" Independent Review Policy, supra note 124, § 2; Reconsideration Policy, supra note 124.
9" Reconsideration Policy, supra note 124.
2" Independent Review Policy, supra note 124, § 2.
231 Id. § 6.
232 Id. §§ 3.1, 5.12.3; see Weinberg, supra note 2, at 229.
233 See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 231.
"4 See it.
233 See id.
25° See id.
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How effectively the ICANN independent review process works as
a check on ICANN power remains to be seen. 257 As of March 2002, the
Independent Review Nominating Committee has been unable to se-
lect members for the Independent Review Board. 235 A determination
of whether ICANN's bylaws and articles of incorporation provide
sufficient constraints on ICANN's actions will have to wait until the
Independent Review Board is formed and operational.259
3. Adjudication
•	 The third similarity between ICANN and administrative agencies
is the availability of adjudication for individual disputes. 24° The UDRP
provides for an individualized inquiry into specific facts and circum-
stances similar to agency adjudication 241 ICANN has set the proce-
dural and substantive rules for adjudicating UDRP proceedings and
assigned the hearing process to four accredited arbitration services 242
Furthermore, the UDRP proceedings conform with basic due
process requirements and a substantial portion of the APA's adjudica-
tory procedure.245 First, like the APA, the UDRP provides for notice of
the proceeding to the domain name holder. 244 Second, similar to the
APA, the domain name holder is given notice of the applicable law
and facts in a UDRP dispute, both when the domain name holder reg-
isters the domain name and when a complaint is brought. 245 Third,
the domain name holder has an opportunity to submit facts and ar-
guments, also a feature of the APA.246 Moreover, these three elements
are consistent with the basic due process requirements of notice and
opportunity to respond. 247
Some commentators, however, argue that the UDRP does not
guarantee sufficient due process protection. 248 These concerns arise
237 See Independent Review, supra note 131.
2" See id.
239 see
246 SeeAdministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000); UDRP, supra note 17, §§ 1-
4; UDRP Rules, supra note 102, §§ 3, 4, 5, 15.
241 See Yeskr Terrace Cmt3z Council, 37 F.3d at 448; UDRP, supra note 17, §§ 1-4.
242 See UDRP, supra note 17, §§ 1-4; UDRP Rules, supra note 102, §§ 3, 4, 5, 15.
247 See 5 U.S.C. §554(b)-(c); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm'n v. McGrath 341 U.S.
123, 178 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); UDRP, supra note 17, §§ 1-4; UDRP Rules,
supra note 102, §§ 3, 4, 5, 15.
244 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(b); UDRP Rules, supra note 102, § 4(a).
246 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(b); UDRP Rules, supra note 102, § 3(b) (ix).
246 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(c); UDRP Rules, supra note 102, § 5.
247 See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 178 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
242 See Froomkin, supra note 8, at 98-100; Thornburg, supra note 2, at 188, 196.
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because the UDRP operates through completely private means. 249 The
dispute resolution providers are private arbitrators, the rules of pro-
cedure are decided by the parties, and the arbitration panel decides
the sufficiency of the complaint, the admissibility of evidence, and the
manner of the proceedings.25° Some claim the danger of private adju-
dication is that private processes can be engineered to eliminate those
procedures that may be deemed too expensive or disadvantageous. 251
B. ICANN Should Be Granted Deference
In the end, though similar, ICANN is not an administrative
agency.252 ICANN is not an authority of the U.S. government; its
power to regulate the domain name system does not come from any
organic statute passed by Congress.255
 Yet treating ICANN like an
agency by granting UDRP decisions deference addresses the due pro-
cess concerns and larger legitimacy concerns faced by ICANN and its
UDRP.254
For instance, concerns about the UDRP's lack of adequate due
process guarantees could be tempered by judicial review of UDRP de-
cisions.255 The involvement of public institutions provides some lever-
age to ensure accountability by private regulators and adjudicators. 258
UDRP panelists may be less inclined to overstep their procedural
bounds if U.S. courts were able to review UDRP decisions for proce-
dural regularity as courts do for administrative agencies. 257
Furthermore, deferential review of the UDRP's procedural and
substantive standards may be more useful than the current de novo
review by U.S. courts. 258
 A court reaching a different conclusion on
the merits says nothing about the adequacy of UDRP procedure or
substantive findings.259
 If there are indeed failings in the UDRP, judi-
2 9 See Thornburg, supra note 2, at 189.
230
 See id.; UDRP, supra note 17, §§ 1-4; UDRP Rules, supra note 102, § 15(a).
257 See Thornburg, supra note 2, at 188, 196.
252 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
255 See id.
254 See infra notes 255-269 and accompanying text.
255 See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Dinwoodie & Helfer, supra note 7, at 207; Perritt, supra note 8, at
258-59.
256 See Perrin, supra note 8, at 258-59.
257 See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Perritt, supra note 8, at 258-59.
255
 See Dinwoodie & Helfer, supra note 7, at 207.
259 See id.
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cial review would highlight them and promote the internalization of
appropriate standards.26°
Judicial review and deference would also address due process
concerns as well as shore up ICANN's legitimacy. 261 In fact, judicial
review is a common tool for legitimizing agency action. 262 Administra-
tive law has traditionally been concerned with reconciling broad
agency policymaking discretion with an agency's insulation from
democratic controls.263 Procedural safeguards are one way to accom-
plish this goal—for example the notice-and-comment rulemaking in
which both agencies and ICANN engage.264 Judicial review of agency
action is another.265
 Although ICANN has a form of independent re-
view for its actions, there is no such review for the UDRP.266
Finally, court involvement in a private adjudication could
significantly legitimize UDRP decisions and ICANN's regulation of
the domain name system.267 Court review could serve as a check on
the fears that ICANN is wielding unrestrained power in domain name
disputes.268
 In addition, the effectiveness of UDRP decisions will in-
crease once those decisions are granted deference. 269
CONCLUSION
ICANN resembles an administrative agency both in procedure
and in substance. For courts seeking to determine how to treat UDRP
decisions, this resemblance should be instructive. Given the similari-
ties between ICANN's dispute resolution policy and agency adjudica-
tion, courts should grant UDRP decisions the same deference granted
to administrative agencies.
The domain name system in many ways defies the traditional
mode of Internet development. Whereas much of the technology of
the Internet was developed in a decentralized, consensus-driven envi-
ronment, the domain name system is hierarchical and dominated by
ICANN and the Department of Commerce. The aspects of ICANN
260
 See id,
Yet See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 219-20,225.
262 See id. at 221.
263 See id. at 219.
2'64 See id. at 221-22.
266 See id. at 221.
266 See Independent Review Policy, supra note 124, § 2; Reconsideration Policy, supra note
124.
267
 SeeDinwoodie & Helfer, supra note 7, at 254-55.
262 See id. at 258.
289 See Perritt, supra note 8, at 262.
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that most reflect its Internet roots of decentralization and consensus,
however, are also the aspects that resemble agency decisionmaking.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, decentralized dispute resolution,
and review of decisions by the public and the judiciary until public
acceptance has been established are reminiscent of the Internet pio-
neers' approach to technical engineering problems. Perhaps judicial
deference to the more agency-like aspects of ICANN could bring the
domain name system closer to the tradition of Internet development.
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